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International Trade and Workers’ Rights: Practical Tools for
Reading Labor Rights Provisions of Free Trade Agreements
by Be njamin Holt & Mic ha el Wa ller

W

STANDING

ORKERS’ RIGHTS ARE A CONTENTIOUS PART

of the
public debate surrounding the enactment of Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs). Labor rights advocates
criticize these trade regimes for reflecting a zealous
pursuit of trade and investment deregulation without creating an institutional infrastructure sufficiently protective of workers’ basic needs,
such as respectful treatment, high work and safety standards, livable
wages and benefits, and rights of association and collective bargaining.
Opponents of current FTAs assert that while international free trade
may bring certain benefits to a national economy, workers often bear
a disproportionate burden because low labor standards, amid competition for scarce investment capital, offer developing countries a comparative economic advantage. The predicted result is that both developing and developed countries engage in a zero-sum race towards
labor market deregulation. The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), which became effective in 1994, was the first
FTA to acknowledge the nexus between free trade and the diminishing social and economic protections for workers. The United States,
Mexico, and Canada negotiated a side agreement to the NAFTA, the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), with a
stated resolve to “protect, enhance, and enforce basic workers’ rights.”
Subsequent FTAs entered into by the United States with Jordan
(“U.S.-Jordan”) in 2001, Singapore (“U.S.-Singapore”) in 2003, and
Chile (“U.S.-Chile”), also in 2003, have reinforced this linkage.
Unfortunately, the vaguely worded principles and commitments to
labor rights of these FTAs beg questions as to their effectiveness and
significance.
Although the above agreements have taken important steps in the
process of institutionalizing and articulating the free trade/labor rights
nexus, they are wholly inadequate if they do not lead to stronger protections. The objective of this article is to make FTA texts quickly
accessible, to provide a critical tool with which to analyze FTAs, and to
recognize opportunities for and obstacles to strengthening labor protections. The strategy will be to illuminate the substance of these FTAs
with an eye towards strengthening labor provisions in future agreements, an especially urgent task in light of the current trend to create
larger free trade regimes such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA). The FTAA is a hemisphere-wide trade and investment agenda
that has thus far made no effort to address workers’ rights.
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On the whole, the opportunities for private individuals to invoke
the enforcement mechanisms of the NAALC, U.S.-Jordan, and U.S.Singapore range from limited to non-existent. Each FTA requires
Party governments (“Parties”) to create “contact points” or offices that
have a duty to receive public input or communications from the private sector. The FTAs provide no specifics as to what is to be done
with public comments, except for a requirement that these “contact
points” exist and that certain discretionary procedural elements, established at the discretion of the governments, be satisfied. Moreover, the
FTAs deny each country the authority to create a private right of
action enforceable in their domestic courts for violations of the agreement by another Party. In other words, if the U.S. fails to effectively
enforce its labor laws as required by U.S.-Jordan, a Jordanian may not
file suit against the U.S. in Jordanian courts.

FTAA March for Global Justice, November 2003.

ENFORCEMENT AND REMEDIES
The NAALC Labyrinth
While these FTAs establish complicated and legalistic enforcement procedures, each fails to provide remedies for workers who suffer from violations of domestic law. Other groups, such as investors,
can demand money damages. NAFTA, for example, provides individual investors with clear recourse to money damages while the NAALC
denies any remedy to aggrieved workers. Through its labyrinthine provisions, the NAALC essentially establishes a three-tiered system of
enforcement: submissions, evaluation, and arbitration. The complaint
process begins at National Administrative Offices (NAOs) which,
among other functions, serve as the contact point for public submissions. The NAALC, however, does not mandate procedures for the
submission process but instead gives each NAO the authority to establish its own rules of procedure.
In the U.S. NAO, once submissions have been accepted for
review, the process looks much like a trial with the features of investigation, a public hearing, and a final report with recommendations.
However, these reports do not lead to enforceable judgments, effectively leaving the prospect of a negotiated solution between the Parties

PARSING THE TEXTS: INCOMPLETE COMMITMENTS
THE NAALC, U.S.-JORDAN, AND U.S.-SINGAPORE contain five
components that are crucial to an understanding of their effectiveness:
(1) standing; (2) enforcement and remedies; (3) substantive law; (4)
transparency and public awareness (sometimes called “sunshine”); and
(5) cooperative activities. Analyzing the labor provisions of an FTA
text with these five components in mind provides an overall picture of
their value for workers’ rights advocates.
Benjamin Holt and Michael Waller are J.D. candidates at the Washington College of
Law.
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the issue. After a final intervention by the Joint Committee, the comas the de facto ruling. For example, if a group of Canadian workers
plaining Party can “take any appropriate and commensurate measure”
were to allege that Canada failed to enforce their right to organize, the
if the problem persists. This phrase implies that a Party could go so far
U.S. NAO may very well determine that a violation occurred and recas to suspend trade benefits under appropriate circumstances. The
ommend that the Parties negotiate a solution. However, the NAO can
process is certainly less cumbersome procedurally and broader in scope
do no more than this. To date, NAOs have received twenty-six public
than the NAALC, but it does not provide for public initiation of comcommunications and the Party-negotiated outcomes, while at times
plaints.
filled with symbolic value, have been composed of less than imposing
In contrast to U.S.-Jordan, however, U.S.-Singapore strictly limremedies, such as seminars, conferences, reports and outreach sessions.
its the type of issues that can be the subject of consultations and disAlthough these outcomes may raise awareness of the workers’ plights,
pute settlement under the agreement. Where consultations have been
they do not effectively respond to the abuses of their rights.
unsuccessful, the complaining Party can refer
While in practice no case has yet moved
the matter to the Joint Committee. In turn, if
beyond this first stage of enforcement, the
the Joint Committee cannot resolve the disNAALC authorizes Parties to seek further
pute, a Party can request the formation of disanalysis through an Evaluation Committee of
pute settlement panel which will eventually
Experts (ECE) as the second step in enforceissue a final report to the parties. If the panel
ment. If an ECE determines that it has jurisfinds that there has been a violation of the
diction over a particular matter, it will make
agreement, the Parties should attempt to
non-binding recommendations to which
resolve it through negotiations. If no such resParties must respond in writing. After anotholution is possible, then the panel will reconer round of consultations aimed at reaching a
vene to impose an annual monetary assessresolution, a Party may move to the third tier
ment, which is capped at $15 million (U.S.)
of enforcement and request the formation of
per year, on the party complained against. If
an arbitration panel made up of three labor
the assessment is not paid, the complaining
law “experts.” In theory, where an arbitral
party may impose trade sanctions “as necespanel finds a violation of the relevant labor
sary to collect the assessment, while bearing in
standards, the Parties are encouraged to agree
A protestor concerned about the impact of the
FTAA on jobs.
mind the Agreement’s objective of eliminating
on an “action plan” to remedy the situation.
barriers to bilateral trade.” The agreement also
If no such accord can be reached or impleestablishes a “Labor Cooperation Mechanism” which is meant to overmented, the arbitral panel “may” be reconvened with the power to
see general principles, facilitate consultations between Parties, and
“impose a monetary enforcement assessment.” This power is entirely
make non-binding recommendations related to labor issues.
discretionary, and a fine may not exceed $20 million (U.S.), regardless
of the nature of the violation. For the sake of perspective, private comSUBSTANTIVE LAW
panies have recovered up to $16.7 million (U.S.) for violations of the
NAFTA’s far-reaching investment chapter. Additionally, in the unlikeThe NAALC Bottleneck
ly event that such a fine would be imposed, the money is not paid to
Each agreement strictly delimits the substance of available labor
the workers whose rights have been violated but rather into a “fund”
protections. Within the NAALC, each stage of enforcement imposes
that is used to improve labor law enforcement by the violating Party.
new conditions and restrictions on the enforceable substantive law.
Finally, if a Party refuses to pay a monetary assessment, the complaining
NAOs may accept for review submissions covering a broad range of
Party may suspend related “NAFTA benefits in an amount no greater
issues in “relation to the other Party’s labor law, its administration, or
than that sufficient to collect the monetary enforcement assessment.”
labor market conditions in its territory.” For instance, many of the
The NAALC’s evaluation and arbitration procedures, limited
submissions accepted at the NAO level have involved core worker
though they are by the available substantive law described below, do
rights like the right to organize and freedom of association. However,
contain some teeth. Since these procedures are only available to govonce a Party requests the establishment of an ECE, the relevant law
ernments, however, they ultimately pose little threat to employers who
narrows dramatically. An ECE can only analyze “patterns of practice
exploit vulnerable workers. Workers who suffer actual harms have no
by each Party in the enforcement of its occupational safety and health
ability to directly utilize the final two tiers of enforcement, which have
or other technical labor standards as they apply to the particular matsat completely idle since their creation in 1994.
ter considered” in earlier ministerial consultations. Two caveats further
Moving Away from the NAALC:
constrain the applicable law: the “pattern of practice” must be tradeU.S.-Jordan and U.S.-Singapore
related and “mutually-recognized labor laws” must govern the practice
in question.
U.S.-Jordan is more generous to workers than the NAALC, but
Such limitations mean that Mexico cannot dispute individual viois limited in its own ways. Unlike the NAALC, one dispute settlement
lations of labor laws in the U.S., but only those labor standards protectmechanism governs the entire agreement. Workers and workers’ rights
ed by law in both countries. Facial challenges of unfair laws and comactivists, who argued for the inclusion of labor standards within the
plaints about the absence of certain labor protections are simply not relmain body of the FTA, considered this to be a significant though limevant before an ECE, were one to ever be formed. The definition of
ited gain. When a conflict arises over the operation or interpretation
“technical labor standards” refers to a short list of labor laws and reguof the agreement, a Party may request consultations with the other
lations that pertain to prohibitions against forced labor, child-labor
Party which, if unsuccessful, will be referred to the Joint Committee
laws, minimum employment standards (like minimum wage), employcreated to oversee the entire agreement. If the Joint Committee canment discrimination, equality of pay between genders, occupational
not settle the matter, a dispute settlement panel will attempt to resolve
43

lations, procedures and administrative rulings available in a way that
allows interested persons to become “acquainted with them.” However
impressive these tentative attempts to foster transparency and education may appear, Parties and the institutional bodies created by the
agreement retain almost complete discretion in making decisions or
reports produced under the NAALC publicly available.
While the substantive commitment to transparency may seem
insincere under the NAALC, U.S.-Jordan makes both motive and
function clear: there is simply no mention of transparency or public
information at all. Perhaps aware of the political currency that attends
such terminology, U.S.-Singapore devotes Article 17.3 to “procedural
guarantees and public awareness,” calling generally for transparent
administrative, judicial and quasi-judicial processes. Significantly, the
agreement offers no further explanation. However, the Parties may, at
their discretion, make public decisions concerning implementation of
any provision of the labor chapter.

health, compensation for injuries and protection of migrant workers.
For example, an ECE could only investigate an allegation that the U.S.
government was not enforcing its child labor laws if the complaining
Party, for instance Mexico, also had child labor laws. Moreover, Mexico
could only request an ECE if it alleged that the U.S. was persistently
failing to live up to its own standards. Mexico could not complain that
the U.S.’ child labor laws did not sufficiently protect children.
A bottleneck occurs at the arbitration, or third stage of the
enforcement mechanism. At this stage, Parties may only discuss complaints addressing a “persistent pattern of failure” to “effectively
enforce” a Party’s domestic law relating to “occupational safety and
health, child labor, and minimum wage technical labor standards” that
were the subject matter of the pertinent ECE report. Another constraint accentuates the bottleneck. An accused country may argue pursuant to Article 49 that its alleged failure to enforce “reflects a reasonable exercise of [the government’s] discretion with respect to prosecutorial, regulatory, or compliance matters” or “results from bona fide
decisions to allocate resources to enforcement” of other labor matters
that are a higher priority. For example, if Canada accused Mexico of
failing to enforce child labor laws in its textile industry, Mexico could
argue that its resources were better spent on the promotion of safer
working conditions in maquiladoras.

COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES
The NAALC promotes “cooperative activities” among the Parties
and, while no mention is made of these in U.S.-Jordan, they have
reappeared in U.S.-Singapore and other recently enacted FTAs. Over
the last ten years, the NAALC Council and NAOs have sponsored
many seminars, studies, and public events geared towards providing
the public, NGOs, and government officials with information about
the legal systems and labor conditions in each of the three countries.
Topics have included, among others, the conditions of migrant agricultural workers in the U.S., the rights of working women in North
America, and occupational health and safety. At least one author has
suggested that these efforts have “deepened the reservoir of comparative labor law and industrial relations expertise among the three countries…[and] have encouraged development of a tri-national web of
contacts” among labor unions, NGOs, governments, and employers.
Such an optimistic judgment seems easy to dismiss. However, in the
absence of more substantive remedial measures, it is worth noting that
cross-border organizing, increased public awareness, and a better
understanding of foreign legal systems will be an integral part of any
movement to secure and protect workers’ rights in the global economy.

Only the Bare Essentials: U.S.-Jordan and U.S.Singapore
Determining the substantive law of the U.S.-Jordan FTA is simpler than with the NAALC. There is no tiered process that limits the
scope of applicable law depending on the stage of enforcement. Parties
have two obligations: (1) they must “strive to ensure” that their
domestic laws protect five enumerated labor rights (right of association, right to organize and bargain collectively, no forced labor, no
child labor, and minimum wages, hours of work and occupational
safety and health), and (2) they must “not fail to effectively enforce”
their laws with respect to these enumerated labor rights. Like the
NAALC, violations must be trade-related and systematic to be
enforceable, and bona fide decisions regarding the allocations of
resources provide a defense. The five listed labor rights are more narrow than the NAALC’s eleven principles of labor, but they can be carried further through the enforcement process.
The substantive law in U.S.-Singapore is even more limited than
in the above agreements. Although the actionable laws in U.S.Singapore are virtually identical to U.S.-Jordan, no other labor-related complaints may be the subject of consultations or dispute resolution. This distinction can be significant. For example, while the “strive
to ensure” language in U.S.-Jordan may be vague, it could be the basis
for a complaint because all aspects of that agreement are subject to its
dispute resolution mechanisms. For labor-related misconduct under
U.S.-Singapore, a failure to “strive to ensure” labor standards in accordance with the minimum set out in the agreement could not be raised
between the Parties as a complaint.

RECOMMENDATIONS
IT IS IMPORTANT TO ARTICULATE A THOUGHTFUL CRITIQUE of
the many ways in which FTAs fail to protect workers. Workers’ rights
advocates, however, must challenge the hollow provisions of current
agreements by offering concrete alternatives. Policy makers need a rich
literature of possibilities to draw upon. Some general suggestions follow: (1) FTA architects must develop truly multinational complaint
processes accessible to aggrieved workers, as well as their governments;
(2) FTAs need to incorporate labor provisions into the main texts of
the agreements without prejudicial caveats, especially in the context of
remedies; (3) states parties should integrate labor standards into the
agreements regardless of domestic law and encourage cross-national
understanding of domestic laws and labor conditions; and finally, (4)
procedural commitments to public awareness should invoke tough
penalties if ignored.
The 1994 enactment of the NAALC was a watershed event for
workers’ rights advocates, and the integration of the U.S.-Jordan labor
provisions into the main text of the FTA might, in fact, be a step forward. Nonetheless, the reality is that current FTAs offer no real relief
and scant hope to workers struggling against the free trade mantra
“labor market flexibility.”
HRB

TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC AWARENESS
“Sunshine,” or public awareness of labor rights violations, deters
abusive employment practices, though its effectiveness is dubious
when unsupported by robust enforcement provisions. Article 1 of the
NAALC admonishes the Parties to “foster transparency in the administration of labor law” as an objective of the agreement. To this end,
the NAALC calls on each Party to “ensure” that any administrative,
quasi-judicial, or judicial hearings on labor enforcement be open to
the public and transparent. Each Party must also make its laws, regu44

